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Abstract We give an assessment of the loss in the nominal gross domestic product 
(GDP) and nominal gross national income (GNI) due to twenty- seven months of intifada. 
It is based on the modest growth scenario given by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in their first assessment of the economic developments 
in 2006 in Palestine. It turns out that the assessed loss is equivalent to the GDP of 1997 
and the GNI in 1999: one year on two (and a quarter). Moreover, we show that our 2004 
estimates of macro figures of 2002, based on a static computable general equilibrium 
model, are closer to the 2007 consensus estimates by IMF and WB than the 2003 
estimates of IMF, based on an income-expenditure model. We argue that the shortening 
of the time horizon and the quantity adjustment following the dramatic shock explain why 
our model performs better.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 In a previous paper (Missaglia and De Boer, 2004) we simulated the impact of different 
foreign assistance policies on the economy of Palestine from the beginning of the 
second intifada, 20 September 2000, until ultimo 2002. Thereto we constructed a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that we calibrated on the 1998 social 
accounting matrix (SAM) constructed by the World Bank (WB). Based on information 
supplied in the study WB (2003b)1 and on information obtained from the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) we gave a shock to the model and constructed a 
counterfactual SAM for 2002 on which we based our policy simulations.  
 At the time of writing it was unknown until when the second intifada, at least from the 
economic point of view, would last. Moreover, we only disposed of estimates of the 
World Bank (WB, 2003 a, b, c) and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2003) of 
macro figures for 2002. We were struck by the fact that there were substantial 
differences between these estimates and we decided to propose our own evaluation (De 
Boer and Missaglia, 2006). Our conclusion was that our estimates with the help of a 
static CGE model were remarkably close to those of IMF that based its estimates on an 
entirely different methodology (a macro-founded income-expenditure model). We 
learned from private communications that, at the time of writing the latter paper, IMF, 
WB and PCBS were closely working together to reach consensus estimates.  
 In March 2007, IMF and World Bank (IMF&WB, 2007) published a first assessment of 
the economic developments in 2006 of the economy of Palestine and provided the 
consensus estimates of the macro economic figures for 2002 using data that are more 
up-to-date and more complete than the data IMF disposed of in 2003.  
 The purpose of this note is twofold: first, we argue that from the economic point of view 
the end of the second intifada is ultimo 2002 and give an assessment of the loss in GDP 
and GNI caused by the twenty-seven months of intifada. This estimate is based on the 
modest growth scenario given in IMF&WB (2007). Secondly, we propose to compare our 
2004 estimates (DBM, 2004) of the macro figures with those of IMF (2003), both 
presented in De Boer and Missaglia (2006), with the consensus estimates of IMF&WB 
(2007). In the appendix we derive these consensus estimates, which are likely being the 
definitive figures for 2002. 
 In section 2 we give our assessment of the economic loss due to intifada, whereas 
section 3 is devoted to the comparison of our estimates with those of IMF. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Assessment of the economic loss due to intifada 
 
In table 1, reproduced from table 2 of IMF&WB (2007), we give the percentage change 
in real gross domestic product (GDP) and in real gross national income (GNI). 
 
Table 1 Real GDP and real GNI (percentage change) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20062
Gross domestic product 8.9 -5.4 -15.4 -9.4 5.8 6.0 6.0 -8.0 
Gross national income 8.4 -6.8 -20.1 -9.1 6.6 4.3 6.8 -7.6 
  
 The second intifada started on 20 September 2000 and it follows from table 1 that the 
Palestinian economy declined until 2003; whereas it experienced a recovery in 2003-
2005. Consequently, from the economic point of view the second intifada runs from 20 
September 2000 to ultimo 2002, the period of twenty-seven months that we studied in 
our previous two papers!  
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 In table 2 we give an assessment of the loss in nominal GDP and GNI. We base our 
“growth scenario” on footnote 7 of IMF&WB (2007) which reads: “If the Palestinian 
economy had grown at a steady, but modest 3 percent each year since 1999, with a 3 
percent annual GDP deflator, nominal GDP would have been more than $2 billion higher 
in 2006”.  
 
Table 2 Assessment of the loss in nominal GDP and GNI due to  
             the second intifada: 20 September 2000 – ultimo 2002 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total   
2000-
2002 
GDP* 
(growth 
scenario) 
4,517** 
 
4,792 5,084 5,394 15,270 
GDP**  4,442 3,746 3,156 11,344 
Loss in 
GDP 
         3,926 
GNI* 
(growth 
scenario) 
5,454** 5,786 6,139 6,512 18,437 
GNI**  5,276 4,193 3,546 13,013 
Loss in 
GNI 
         5,424 
 
* 3 percent real growth and 3 percent annual deflator 
** Consensus estimates by PCBS, IMF and WB, table 3 of IMF&WB (2007) 
 In the second row we calculate the nominal GDP according to the growth scenario and 
in the final column we give the total over the years 2000 - 2002, arriving at 15,270 million 
US$. In the third row we present the consensus estimates by PCBS, IMF and WB (table 
3, IMF&WB, 2007) giving rise to a total of 11,344 over 2000 - 2002. In row 4 we give the 
difference which is our assessment of the loss due to intifada. Its amount is 3,926 million 
US$, which is almost equal to the nominal GDP of 1997 that is estimated to be 4,009 
million US$ by PCBS and IMF (IMF, 2003, table 2.1). 
 In row 5 we apply the very same scenario to nominal GNI leading to a total of 18,437 
million (see the last column). In row 6 we give the consensus estimates that amount to 
13,013 million US$ resulting in an assessment of the loss in nominal GNI of 5,424 million 
US$; which is almost equal to the GNI of 1999 of 5,454 million US$! 
 
3. Comparison of the estimates of DBM (2004) and IMF (2003) with the consensus 
estimates 
 
In table 3 we reproduce in the columns 2 and 3 the estimates of the macro figures of De 
Boer and Missaglia and of the IMF presented in table 2 of De Boer and Missaglia (2006), 
whereas the consensus estimates, derived in the appendix to this paper, are given in 
column 4. In column 5 and 6 we give the prediction errors (%) of DBM and IMF. 
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Table 3 Comparison of macro figures for 2002 (millions of US$, prices 1998) 
estimated by DBM (in 2004) and IMF (in 2003) with the consensus estimates  
of IMF&WB (2007) 
 
1 
Macro variable 
2 
DBM 
(2004) 
 
3 
IMF 
(2003) 
4 
IMF-WB 
(2007) 
5 
Prediction 
error (%) 
DBM  
6 
Prediction 
error (%) 
IMF  
Private consumption 3,658 3,956 3,804 -3.8 4.0 
Public consumption 1,130 1,041 957 18.1 8.8 
Total fixed 
investment3 
997 661 851 17.1 -22.4 
Exports 467 426 486 -4.0 -12.4 
Imports 2,831 2,896 2,733 3.6 6.0 
Gross domestic 
product 
3,421 3,188 3,362 1.7 -5.2 
Net factor income 390 465 425 -8.2 9.5 
Gross national 
income 
3,811 3,653 3,787 0.6 -3.5 
Private consumption 
plus total fixed 
investment 
4,655 4,617 4,656 -0.0 0.1 
 
 It follows from the prediction errors that we slightly overestimated gross domestic 
product and gross national income, whereas IMF underestimated these figures. In 
absolute value our estimates are (much) closer to the consensus estimates of IMF&WB 
than IMF. The same conclusion holds true when we compare the prediction errors for 
foreign trade (exports and imports). Both DBM and IMF overestimated the public 
consumption, but IMF is closer to the consensus estimate than DBM. For private 
consumption and total fixed investment we are closer to the consensus estimates than 
IMF. However, as stated in our paper (De Boer and Missaglia, 2006) we have to be 
cautious because of the treatment of the sector “Construction” in the SAM: the whole 
output is classified as “investment”, while a part of it consists of “residential building”. 
The latter kind of investment (or at least a part of it: its annual equivalent) should be 
assimilated, from the point of view of its economic impact, as consumption. In the last 
row of table 2 we give the results for the sum of private consumption and total fixed 
investment. It shows that both DBM and IMF are extremely close to the consensus 
estimates.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
 In this note we gave an assessment of the loss in GDP and GNI caused by twenty-
seven months of intifada. This estimate was based on the modest growth scenario given 
in IMF&WB (2007). A clearly related topic is the evaluation of the macro figures for the 
Palestinian economy, a politically delicate issue that gave rise to different evaluations of 
IMF (2003), World Bank (WB, 2003, a, b, c) and, more recently, a joint evaluation of the 
two organizations (IMF&WB, 2007). In this note we compared our 2004 estimates of the 
macro figures with those of IMF (2003), both presented in De Boer and Missaglia (2006), 
with the consensus estimates of IMF&WB (2007). In section 2 we showed that twenty-
seven months of intifada prompted a loss in nominal GNI substantially equivalent to the 
 5
1999 GNI. It is as if the Palestinian economy completely stopped working for one year 
out of two (and a quarter). In section 3 we showed that our simple, static CGE model for 
Palestine performed better than the IMF income-expenditure model (IMF, 2003) in 
predicting such tremendous loss. We believe that this good predicting performance may 
be explained by two features of our CGE model: its simplicity – most notably its static 
nature – and the treatment of the labor market, in particular the theory of unemployment4 
we adopted in the model. As to the first point – the static nature of the model – one 
should not forget that a dramatic shock such as intifada shortens the time horizon of 
people. It would not make a lot of sense assuming intertemporal optimizing behavior. 
People reactions to similar shocks are almost by definition short run reactions. If the 
shock is long lasting, as it is the case with the intifada shock, this could even strengthen 
our point: time horizons become shorter and shorter. As to the theory of unemployment 
we adopted, wage rigidities in the Palestinian labor market are mainly due to the 
proximity with the Israeli labor market. These rigidities are not eliminated by a shock 
such as intifada (despite the closure policy quite a lot of Palestinians are still working 
“illegally” in Israel and, on top of that, each worker may always hope to be the one to 
whom a work permit is provided) and therefore the adjustment following a shock is a real 
(quantity) adjustment, which makes the adjustment process more unevenly distributed 
and thus heavier to bear. 
 These two points – the shortening of the time horizon and the quantity adjustment 
following a shock – must be included n a model whose aim is building a realistic 
scenario concerning the economic impact of intifada.     
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Appendix: Derivation of the consensus estimates  
 
Table Consensus estimates IMF&WB (2007) for 2002 (prices 1998, US$million) 
1 
Macro variable 
2 
1998 
(US$ 
million) 
3 
1999
(%) 
4 
2000
(%) 
5 
2001
(%) 
6 
2002
(%) 
7 
Index 
2002 
(1998 =1) 
8 
2002 
(prices1998,
US$million) 
Private consumption 4,245 8.3 -4.4 -5.4 -8.5 0.896  3,804
Public consumption 954 9.4 -11.6 -4.3 -1.6 1.003 957
Private investment 1,124 36.0 -26.5 -52.1 8.7 0.520 585
Public investment 273 25.5 -29.4 -9.9 11.1 0.887 242
Change inventories 98 62.3 -73.5 -8.9 -36.7 0.248 24
Exports 886 3.7 -6.8 -34.7 -13.0 0.549 486
Imports 3,321 19.1 -13.9 -18.1 -2.0 0.823 2,733
Gross domestic 
product (GDP) 
4,258 8.9 -5.4 -15.4 -9.4 0.790 3,362
Net factor income 903  425
Gross national 
income (GNI) 
5,161 8.4 -6.8 -20.1 -9.1 0.734 3,787
Net current transfers 409  1,541
Gross disposable 
income (GDI) 
5,569 7.8 -3.5 -4.4 -3.8 0.957 5,328
GDP (sum rows 1-6 
minus row 7) 
4,259  3,366
 
In column 2 we give the macro figures of IMF for 1998 (see table 2, De Boer& Missaglia, 
2006). In the columns 3-6 we reproduce the percentage change in the real values given 
in table 2 of IMF&WB (2007). In column 7 we give the index5 for each variable. 
Multiplication of each of the figures for 1998 (column 2) by the corresponding index gives 
the consensus estimate for 2002 in prices 1998 given in column 8. In the row “Net factor 
income” we give its estimate by subtracting Gross domestic product (GDP) from Gross 
national income (GNI) and in the row “Net current transfers” its estimate by subtracting 
GNI from Gross disposable income (GDI).  Since we work with percentage changes, 
rounded off at one decimal place, we might make rounding errors. In the last row we 
give the calculation of GDP by taking subtracting “Imports” (row 7) from the sum of the 
first six rows (“Private consumption” through “Exports”). It turns out that rounding errors 
are negligible.   
 
                                                
1 The reports of IMF&WB (2007), IMF (2003) and WB (2003a,b,c) can be found at 
http://people.few.eur.nl/pmdeboer/research. 
2 In January 2006 Hamas won the elections and the Palestinian Authority (PA) government, led 
by Hamas, was confronted with diplomatic and financial isolation by the international community, 
with internal tensions and with tensions with Israel. It resulted in another decline of the Palestinian 
economy.  
3 In table 2 we give total fixed investment which is the sum of private, public investment and 
change in inventories. 
4  In the model we use the unemployment theory delineated in the migration literature by Harris 
and Todaro (1970) to describe the wage gap between rural and urban jobs. 
5 The index of real private consumption, for instance, is equal to: (1+0.083)x(1-0.044)x(1-0.054)x 
(1-0.085)=0.896. 
